African Anti-Corruption Agencies: Challenges and Prospects

Okechukwu I. Eme, Igwe Izuchukwu Samuel, Ezenwafor Emmanuel Chidubem

1 Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
2 Department of Public Administration, Federal Polytechnic Oko, Nigeria
3 Department of Accountancy, Federal Polytechnic Oko, Nigeria

Received 24 August 2017, Accepted 10 October 2017

ABSTRACT: Corruption has become an issue of major political and economic relevance in recent years. This has led to a resurgence of interest in analyzing the phenomenon and the diverse forms that it assumes in developing politics with an expectation that democratization and economic liberation offer potential routes to dealing with the problem. Anti-corruption strategies range from institutional reforms through concerted efforts at the international, populist and local levels, but the efficiency of these approaches has not been subject to careful empirical research. This study examines these issues with reference to the politics and practicalities of anti-corruption strategies in several African societies. It is posited that although right sizing the state and political liberalization are desirable goals in many African states, they are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of corruption. Extensive public and private sector corruption can coexist with democratic politics. Economic liberalization can also create avenues for corruption, through the sale of parastatals in dubious circumstances. For anti-corruption strategies to be effective in the continent, more attention needs to be devoted to questions of sequencing, the details of reform and its sustainability in very poor polities, political will and commitment.

Keywords: African, Corruption, Anti graft agencies

INTRODUCTION

In recent years corruption has become an issue of major econo-political significance in many countries across the globe, including a number of developed Western States. Corruption scandals are a prominent source of media interest and newspapers frequently publish stories about illicit behaviors by politicians and public officials. Partly on account of heightened media attention there is widespread perception that corruption is on the increase, both among the general public who demand effective action and politicians who are eager to derive political capital by adopting a forthright stance over the need to eliminate corrupt practices (Heywood, 1997 and Eme, et al, 2008). This has resulted in the increased electoral popularity of political parties committed to fighting corruption and the launching of high profile anti-corruption campaigns by governments of various ideological hues. Specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been established in a number of countries to publicize the problem of corruption and mobilize public concern around cases of malfeasance as a means of provoking of official response. At the international level there is increased resolve on the part of inter-governmental bodies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the World Bank to tackle the problem of corruption in response to rising concern about aid effectiveness at a time of financial stringency and to public criticism (Robinson, 1998).

While corruption is a feature of all societies to varying degrees, it is a particular concern for developing polities because it undermines economic growth, discourages foreign investment and reduces the resources available for infrastructure, public services and anti-poverty programs (World Bank, 1997). As noted by Johnston (1997), it may also undermine political institutions by weakening the legitimacy and accountability of governments. Corruption also reduces the effectiveness of aid-funded development projects and weakens public support for development assistance in donor countries. In short, it is inimical to sustainable development, poverty reduction and good governance, though it can also have the opposite effect by circumventing cumbersome regulations and facilitating business transactions (Ades and Di. Tella, 1996).

African effort in terms of mitigating corruption at continental and even national level has been very feeble and inconsistent at best. Till date, there has not been any serious and concerted effort inform of effective policy or strategy towards addressing this awesome problem. There are so many reasons for this. As Odenkunle (1986) and World Bank (1997) suggest, the problem with fighting corruption in developing countries especially in Africa is that everybody in government is deeply involved. From the Head of State, Ministers, State and Local council officers down to the lowest ranks of public officer, the primary motivating factor is basically how to use official position to gain illicit advantage of whatever form to the overall detriment of the state and the economic system.

Apart from Nigeria which recently launched a frontal assault on corruption starting from the leadership and the passage of an Anti-corruption Acts and possibly, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Uganda, Ghana, and Malawi, and Kenya with their domestic anti-corruption initiatives, most other sub-Saharan African states have not done much either in terms of creating genuine anti-corruption policy or program or to embark upon institutional and administrative reforms. As a result, practically nothing has been done at the continental level to tackle this problem.

This paper seeks to fill in this gap. This study examines these issues with reference to the politics and practicalities of anti-corruption strategies in several African Societies. It is argued that although institutional reforms are desirable goals in many African countries, they are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of corruption. The first section of the paper clarifies and identifies forms and typologies of corruption; the second section discusses the theoretical underpinning of anti-corruption strategy. The third part examines selected cases of corruption while the fourth part explores the various anti-corruption strategies put in place by selected African States (Kenya and Nigeria will be examined in details). The next section highlights on the challenges and prospects of anti-corruption in the continent. The final section offers recommendations and concludes the paper.

Clarification of Concepts
Theoretical and Thematic Foundation, Forms and Typologies of Corruption

Corruption has no uniform definition. This is because what is regarded as corruption depends on the actors, the profiteers, initiators, how and where it takes place. It also depends on the existing laws and regulations guiding certain actions. Some countries define corruption in the broadest form while others legislated on the narrow definition. The socio-cultural contests and the time dimensions also make a unique definition difficult. There are also levels of corrupt practices. As a result of the fluidity and the evolving nature of the term, the United Nations (2000), the World Bank (1997), Transparency International (1995), Khan(1996) and ICPC Act (2000) among others have adopted a descriptive approach and criminalization of the act to describe what act is corrupt. For example, the United Nations clearly highlighted bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, abuse of office, laundering of proceed of corruption, and obstruction of justice among others as corrupt acts.

The World Bank (1997:2) defines corruption as “the abuse of public power for private benefit”. The Transparency International (1995:1) defines it as “the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain,” Khan (1996:68) on the other hand views corruption as the “behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the action of someone in position of public authority because of private motives such as wealth, power or status”.

From the above theses corruption may be divided into three types: extortive, manipulative and nepotistic. The former refers to a situation where one is forced to bribe in order to gain or protect one’s rights or needs. The second refers to an attempt to influence decisions in one’s favor in any area of life. The last refers to preferential treatment of relatives and friends in appointments to positions, which can also include organizational nepotism that is, special favors given to political parties or organizations (Eme et.al,2009).

For our purpose, corruption refers to any behavior that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the action of someone in position of public trust and authority because of private motives such as wealth, power or status. This definition is significant because it identifies corrupt acts to include fraud, bribery or other improper actions or transactions aimed at changing the course of events, judgments and positions of trust. The activities of African leader capture this descriptive definition of corruption.

On the basis of the above definitions, the basic characteristics of corruption are as follows:
1. It is a deliberate or intentional exploitation of one’s position, status or resources;
2. It may be done directly or indirectly;
3. It is done for personal aggrandizement, whether it is a material gain or an enhancement of power, or prestige or influence;
4. It is done by violating legitimate or sanctioned or commonly accepted norms of behavior; and
5. It is done against the interest of the community or other persons (Sharma and Sadana, 2005:770).

Forms and Typologies of Kleptocratic States

According to Ackerman(1998), official corruption can assume many forms depending on how the paraphernalia of government is organized or disorganized (Nwoye, 2000:102). In her view, four types of Kleptocratic states can be discerned:
1) Pure Kleptocratic states
2) Bilateral monopoly states
3) Mafia – dominated states and
4) Competitive bribery states (Ackerman, 1998:36)

In Pure Kleptocratic States, the state structure, the Head of government deliberately organizes the political and economic system in such a way to enhance his chances of extracting rents and also reallocates these rents for personal use (Ackerman, 1998:37). Most pure kleptocrats often assume the role of “stationary bandit” as long as their power remains unchallenged and economically secure (Nwoye, 2000:102). For instance Late president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (Congo Democratic), Nigeria under late General Abacha and Gen.Olusegun Obasanjo, and Idi Amin of Uganda can rightly be described as pure kleptocrats. This is because the fundamental concern of these political leaders is primarily how to pillage, organize and disorganize their states and economies to their own selfish advantage, regardless of its effects to ordinary populace. Abacha was discovered to have stolen over $3.0 billion which was found in his foreign accounts, apart from his investments in physical assets (Ogunlana, 2007:11).

Not surprisingly, most pure kleptocratic states are also highly repressive, and authoritarian. There is scant regard for democratic participation, rule of law, public opinion and human rights. Under this climate of fear and intimidation, the resources of the state can easily be cornered in league with few cronies who may see nothing wrong in the arrangement. According to the EFCC and the ICPC as at June, 2007, recovered about N613 billion involving 225 convictions (This Day, March. 11, 2008). This represented about four (4) percent of Federal and State budgetary provisions for the period 2002 – 2006.

This was the tip of the iceberg in view of the fact that the bulk of the fraud and corrupt enrichment could not have been discovered. Indeed, it has been estimated that up to 40 percent of government budget at all level was lost to corrupt practices of government officials at various stages.

In Bilateral monopoly states, the corrupt ruler faces a single major briber to the extent that the rent extractions are shared by the briber and the ruler (Ackerman, 1998:44). The relative
strength of the two parties will obviously
determine how gains are shared as well as the
overall size of the benefits.

Ackerman (1998) goes on to posit that in
some bilateral monopoly states, the government
may even go into some form of alliance with a
mafia. A mafia can be regarded as an organized
crime group that provides protective and other
services that in ordinary societies are normally
provided by the state or its agencies. If some
rents can be generated only with the help of the
leader but the leader fears losing all the gains to
the briber, the chances are that the ruler will not
act.

Where a state depends on a few firms to
extract minerals or produce agricultural goods, it
is more likely that such firms may forge an
alliance with the country’s rulers to share the
wealth. Moreover, if the firm has invested
heavily in fixed capital or of its products is a
valuable raw material available only a few
places, the country’s leadership are in a
favorable position to extort more illegal rent
(Ackerman, 1998:44).

What worries me more than anything among
our problems, said former Nigerian President
Shehu Shagari in 1982, “is that of moral
decadence in our country, there is the problem of
bribery, corruption, lack of dedication to duty,
dishonesty, and all such vices” (Klitgaard,
1988:1).

He was right to worry. About a year later, his
civilian government was toppled in a military
coup, which the generals justified by the need to
control corruption. This topic dominated the new
regime’s policies, as foretold in its first press
conference in early 1984: “it is necessary to
reiterate that this new administration will not
tolerate fraud, corruption, squandermania, abuse
of public office for self or group, or other such
vices that characterized the administration of the
past four years (Klitgaard, 1988:1).

We have defined corruption both with
reference to the main actor involved, namely
persons at the highest levels of the political
system, and the purpose of the corrupt behavior,
namely to sustain the hold on power. Hence,
corruption can be for private and group
enrichment, and for power preservation
purposes. Often these forms of corruption are
linked. Corruption in the form of accumulation
or extraction occurs when government officials
use and abuse their hold on power to extract
from the private sector, from government
revenues, and from the economy at large. These
processes of accumulation have been called
extraction, rent-seeking, plunder, and
Kleptocracy (“rule by thieves”), depending on
the extent and context. Extraction takes place
mainly in the form of soliciting bribes in
procurement and government projects, in
privatization processes and in taxation. Military
procurement is known to be particularly affected
by extractive corruption worldwide, because of
the involvement of top-level politicians, national
interest and secrecy. The cases below will
illustrate this thesis.

One example is the South African arms deal
scam, in which the then deputy president (now)
President Jacob Zuma allegedly solicited bribes
from an arms company in return for protecting
the company from investigation and giving it his
“permanent support”.

Another example is the military-political
corruption in Uganda. Here, the Tri-Star
Company obtained unusually generous favors
from the government (like start-up capital, tax
holidays, among others). This led some
parliamentarians to suggest that Kanathan, the
former owner of the company was a mere front
for President Yoweri Museveni. Another
example is Zimwe Construction Company
Limited, which has become one of the most
successful bidders for government construction
work. The company is successful because its
owners have significant connections with
technocrats and political ties with high-level
politicians (including the president).

Related to the above is the military-political
corruption in Uganda. Here army officers, senior
defense ministry officials and civilian
politicians, including President Museveni, have
benefited from Ugandan military operations in
neighboring countries. For instance, Ugandan
forces have advanced into areas of eastern
Congo to profit financially from the plunder of
natural resources. Congo has proven to be a
veritable treasure trove for a small number of
high ranking army officers who together with
their civilian counterparts have become rich
from this plunder.

From Kenya come the Goldenberg and the
graft of the Kibaki regime. The Goldenberg
affairs was a gold and diamond re-export plan, in
which the government of former president Moi paid the Goldenberg Company export subsidies for exports that later proved fictitious. Witnesses have given details of how former government officials allegedly took part in looting government resources through this fake gold and jewellery export compensation scheme. But the graft of the current Kibaki regime is also evident, according to a report by the former leader of the Kenyan Anti-corruption Commission, John Githongo (see Business Africa, 1998:35-38). Allegedly, senior officials in the Kibaki regime are linked to series of fraudulent contracts with the non-existent Anglo-leasing company. Not only were Ministers involved in approving payments, but they also attempted to cover it up when it became clear that they were going to be investigated.

Tanzania may have had no “Goldenberg Scam” as in Kenya or “Livestock Dams Scandals” as in Uganda, but petty corruption is widespread. Ghost workers pervade government ministries and other institutions. “Employers of “ghost workers” rake plenty of money each month while schools had to manage without teachers and hospitals went without nurses or drugs, says a senior researcher at the institute of Development Studies, Dares Salaam University (Business Africa, 1999:35). According to Business Africa, widespread corruption has been facilitated by Tanzania’s complex tax structures and inefficient bureaucracy compounded by shortages of skills.

In 1996, Zambia’s Legal Affairs Minister, Dr. Remmy Mushota walked into the Bank of Zambia in Lusaka and presented a K210 million ($70, 000) government cheque arising from the printing of constitution materials only to be thwarted by cashiers at the bank who prevented one of the most flagrant acts of fraud in the country’s history. Dr. Mushota and his accomplice, Patrick Katyoka, a member of parliament, were subsequently dismissed by former President Frederick Chiluba.

Again, in April 1999 was the turn of former Zambia National Commercial Bank managing director, Knitano Chungu. He was alleged to have authorized advances of $150, 000 to the company Kent Choice (Z) Limited in order to pay off the debt that Kent Choice had with credit Africa (now defunct). Chugu is alleged to have behaved in the same manner in August and September 1996 when he authorized advances estimated at $160, 000, $140, 000 and $105, 000 respectively (Business Africa, 1998:28). He has since been convicted by the Zambian court.

In Africa, as elsewhere, corruption has often had a “Robin Hood in reverse” character: the losers are likely to be the exceptionally poor and marginalized, whilst the winners are already wealthy and part of an inefficient, swollen state. That is, most African corruption rewards the already wealthy: usually, it is a form of redistribution from those in poverty to the office-holding and consequently relatively or extremely rich. In short, corruption can destroy a country’s developmental potential.

In contrast, where a monopolist firm produces an agricultural or mineral product and can easily relocate, or if the raw material is easily available elsewhere, the firm thus can exert a better bargaining advantage (Ackerman, 1998:45). It can insist that the ruler provide infrastructures, guard against labor unrest, force wages down and impose lower tax. Under this situation, the leader may have no alternative other than to meet their demand or risk losing its illicit benefits (Nwoye, 2000:103). Bilateral monopoly states are discernable in Africa and represent small polities with very few natural or agricultural resources that are dependent on external capital and technology. Liberia under Late President William Tolbert, Benin Republic under late Mathew Kerekon, Gurnea under late Sekuo Toure and Conte, and Melewi under Hansting Banda and Kenya under Arap moi among others.

But nothing surpasses the exploits of Kamlesh Mansukhlal Pattni in what has become known as “the Golden berg Scam” – the biggest financial scandal in Kenya’s history. Between 1991 and 1993, Pattni, a business man of Asian origin, with the complicity of senior officials of the Central Bank of Kenya, and custom and Mines and Geological departments, is alleged to have fraudulently obtained $400 million through a special export compensation schemes against exports of gold and diamonds and the sale of foreign exchange to the Central Bank (Gotti, 1999:36) According to World Bank officials in Nairobi, this grand fraud accounted for 6.5 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The mafia – dominated state is a kind of weak and disorganized state with so many public officials engaged in freelance bribery and corruption. Just like in the bilateral monopoly state, these officials may have to contend with a monopolistic briber in the private sector such as a domestic mafia or few transnational corporations. In most cases, the private monopolist tends to dominate the state through buying the cooperation of low – level officials but at the same time incapable of organizing the state into a coherent and unified body (Ackerman, 1998:45). Overall, the structural weakness of the polity may severely hamper the groups’ ability to buy the benefit it wants, since making an agreement with one state official may not deter another from coming forward. This type of mafia – dominated state is more common in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and may include countries like Philippines under late Marcos, Indonesia under Shoharto, Thailand under Tinasworth, Peru under Fujimori, Haiti under the Duvaliers and Brazil, Maxico and Argentina under various military Juntas among others.

The competitive – bribery state is a state in which there are so many corrupt public officials wheeling and dealing with large number of well-placed citizens and firms at the same time. Nigeria to a large extent fits into this classification in the sense that every public official, in one way or the other, is jostling for illicit benefit. The main implication here is that the potential for an upward spiral of corruption may be quite high because the corruption of many officials generally tends to encourage others to accept bribes until every public official becomes immersed in it.

Corruption in Nigeria is visible in both private and public life. Bayley (1966:64) states that evidence abounds in developing nations to show that corruption “forms a permanent or at least not avoidable feature of bureaucratic life”. Opene (1989:16) adds that in Nigeria, corruption is a culture; he claims that corruption in Nigeria “is a way of life. Any endeavor can ingeniously be turned into a goldmine”.

The Columbia Broadcasting Service (CBS) of America in a 60 minutes documentary on Nigeria in December 1994 titled “Corruption incorporated in Nigeria”, introduced the program thus:

Nigeria is beyond doubt the most corrupt nation I have ever reported on or from. International fraud in this African nation has reached epidemic proportion and there is no sign of it abetting (Ikejiani – Clark, 1995:125).

The program is about the growing incidence of Advance Free Fraud (419). According to the presenter;

He walked into a business centre and came out with a letter saying “I, Mike Wallace, Deputy Director of the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Nigeria, has awarded a $1.3 million contract to ED Bradley of 60 minutes to supply earrings to the National Guard. It cost $30 to secure the bogey contract.

We went to the Ikeja local government office where he (the American) procured a Nigerian birth certificate bearing Ikeja local government stamp for about the equivalent of $25.

For between $200 and $300 Wallace secured a Nigerian passport, for the purpose of this passport, Wallace was a farmer born at Edern Idim – Okpot, Akwa Ibom state.

When Wallace tried to see the then Minister for information, Jerry Gana, one of the information assistants asked for money. The civil servant did not know that all the transactions were being recorded (Ikejiani-Clark, 1995:126).

On the whole, it is significant to note that these typologies are not really absolute. It all depends on the econo-political peculiarities of a given polity and the logic of corruption obtainable in that state. Furthermore, the economic logic and the corruption profile of a leadership will undoubtedly influence the kind of rent-seeking and extraction possibilities.

Theoretical Perspectives
This study will combine the pluralist and social empowerment perspectives to the study of anti-corruption strategies. There are various ranges of approaches drawing from various disciplines to the understanding of anti-corruption strategies. Approaches to anti-corruption grounded in public choice theory emphasize economic reforms and downsizing/rightsizing the state as the principal route to reform, whereas the political economy approach advocates conscious political intervention as the fundamental vehicle for anti-corruption efforts.
The pluralist approach, in contrast assumes that political initiatives centered on the creation of new democratic institutions – such as elected parliamentary committees and watch dog bodies – are central to the success of efforts to control corruption. Political reforms are thought to contribute towards an environment which is more conducive to reduced corruption because they can increase the responsiveness of political elites to the will of the people (Little, 1996).

Anti-corruption efforts centered on institutional reforms are premised on a multi-pronged approach which combines reforms in the legal spheres (such as enforceable property and contract rights and measures to enhance the credibility of the judiciary), innovations in the governance sphere (strengthening mechanisms of accountability, controls over discretion and resource use and improvements in terms and conditions of employments for civil servants) and specific institutional mechanisms (such as creating an anti-corruption agency, special courts to review corruption cases, and asset declaration for politicians and civil servants) (Robinson, 1998).

This approach may be appropriate and effective in countries where corruption is not entrenched and where anti-corruption laws, agencies and organizations are in place and have public support. Such societies invariably tend to have the institutional trappings of democracy with governments that are subject to electoral contestation and popular accountability. But while political competition offers opportunities for new political elites to gain legitimacy by taking action against corruption, it can also enable such elites to secure greater access to existing rent-seeking opportunities as evidence from Africa appears to indicate. However, approaches rooted in these traditions tend to confine analysis to particular countries and institutions and frequently overlook the role international actors in shaping the form and content of corrupt practices at the national level.

The creation of democratic institutions and special agencies to combat corruption will only succeed if citizens organize themselves effectively. In this respect Riley (1997) advances the notion of “social empowerment”, which he uses to refer to the range of political and economic resources and alternatives available to citizens, as an integral element of an assault on entrenched or systemic corruption. Actions by organized citizens on complement institutional reforms and provide them with a proper social foundation which is indispensable to their success.

Spontaneous public demonstrations against corrupt politicians have been effective in prompting authorities to remove them from office in some polities (the dismissals of the governments of late Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Color de Melloin Brazil, Shurbato and Thaistinawat in Indonesia) and the recent clamor for the arrest and retrial of James Ibori, Babangida among others are examples but they do not take tackle the root causes of the problem when it permeates all levels of government machinery. At best such actions can lead to a temporary abatement of the problem but it soon resurfaces in other guises. Today, “social empowerment” framework has been strengthened by the activities of the organized civil society organizations such as Transparency in Nigeria (TIN); Coalition Against Corruption (CACOL); publish what you pay Nigeria (PWYPN) among others. But while some organizations with civil society can be a potent force for anti-corruption efforts, other groups benefit from corruption and are resistant to change. This suggests that independent actions by Independent Civil Groups have its limitations, the needs to be complimented by institutional interventions.

Applying these approaches to the study, various African leaders had proclaimed an “ethical revolution” as in Nigeria to combat corruption. The governments had included a code of conduct for public servants in their various constitutions and had established code of conduct Bureau to enforce the “prescribed behaviors”. The leadership had even appointed a Cabinet Minister of National Guidance to provide moral eldership against corruption. More recently, anti-corruption agencies such as the EFCC and ICPC among others and special courts have been established to tackle practices in the continent. Yet according to popular accounts, Africa had grown even more corrupted, leaving its populace more alienated from government and her economy more vulnerable to official venality. The next section of the paper will examine selected cases across
the continent to add currency why the continent is losing the war against corruption.

As a result of the obvious damage that corruption has done in many African societies, politicians and public management specialists and technocrats have made numerous attempts to reduce or minimize the effects of corruption with a series of anti-corruption strategies.

While we now have legislation to regulate the conduct of both public officers and the private sector for corrupt practices, the vices are still very much with us. Bank frauds are in the upsurge, foreign exchange abuses and manipulations are still the stock in trade of many banks, 419 stills looms large, money laundering from corrupt proceeds is visible and apparent. It was in these circumstances that the FAFT threatened to impose counter measures on Nigeria in 2001 if she did nothing to update her laws and take steps to check the perpetration of economic and financial crimes. All these have contributed to keeping investors away.

It is for this reason and the international dimension, which these crimes had assumed that the promulgation of the EFCC Act 2002 became inevitable. The act, which was re-enacted in 2004, is revolutionary in many respects. For the first time, powers of coordination and enforcement of varied but related economic and financial crimes laws are vested in one body. The definition of economic and financial crimes in S.46 of the act is all encompassing. Secondly, because the nature of the crimes handled by the commission is at the heart of the economy, all critical stakeholders including security, law enforcement agencies and apex financial regulators are made members of the commission. Thirdly, apart from the offences created by the EFCC Act itself, the Commission has responsibility to specifically enforce the provisions of other principal laws bordering on economic and financial crimes including: The Money Laundering Act, 2004; The Advance Fee Fraud (and other related offences) Act, 1995; the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malpractices in Banks) Act, 1991, as amended. The Banks and other Financial Institutions act, 1996. The Miscellaneous Offences Act, 1985. Any other law or regulations relating to economic and financial crimes include the Penal Code and Criminal Code See S.7 EFCC Act. It is therefore not so much the lack of laws of deficiencies in them, but the total neglect to enforce them that have been our bane as a nation. The next section of the paper will address these issues.

Africa and Anti-Corruption Strategies

Serious attempts to control corruption are often as old as corruption itself (Riley, 1998:132). A recent study by Sen (1997) and Noon (1984) point to some early examples. In ancient China, many public officials were paid a corruption-preventing allowance to try to ensure their continued honesty. This illustration relates to recent debates about the linkage between the low salary levels of junior civil servants and levels of corruption in the continent. Kautilya, a fourth century BC Indian political analyst, sought to identify forty different ways in which public officials could be corrupt. He also developed a system of spot-checks to reduce corruption, which were accompanied by a rewards and penalties system. Such ancient examples of attempted corruption-control are similar to those developed by public officials and academic analysts in recent years, in the period since the 1960s (Riley, 1998:132).

Broadly speaking, there are four levels or types of anti-corruption strategies which can be identified in operation in most post-independence Africa: International, national, local; and populist (Theobald, 1990).

Since the mid-1990s a series of international anti-corruption initiatives has emerged (OECD, 1997; Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1997], but earlier decades saw African countries themselves develop strategies based upon national and local action including anti-corruption agencies, public inquiries, inspector-general systems, legal and quasi-legal trials, complaints procedures, and public awareness campaigns [Clarke, 1983; Doig, 1995; Heidenheimer, LeVine and Johnston, 1989; IRIS, 1996]. Often a key issue in assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of such strategies is the commitment of the powerful to act effectively to curb corruption (Klitgaard, 1997; Kpundeh, 1997). Populist initiatives such as purges of civil servants and former politicians have not had much success, although the issue of corruption has acquired great political salience in recent years due to the actions of NGOs and activism by lawyers and other public interest
groups [Doig and Riley, 1998; Harsch, 1993; Theobald, 1990; Transparency International (1996)]. The harsh punishment meted out to former public officials in Ghana and Liberia in 1979 and 1980 – which involved populist revolutions (in effect, coups d’etat), dubious trial and speedy public executions for several former heads of state, such as President William Tolbert of Liberia – illustrates a general paradox: extensive high-level corruption can contribute to profound political upheavals, but the problem of corruption does not disappear with the removal of those key officials identifies as corrupt (Jefferies, 1982).

More recently, several countries have adopted public integrity reforms which are associated with the ‘New Public Management’ approach to governance in western societies. These initiatives are often linked to the influence of aid donors or the activities of pressure groups such as Transparency International (TI). Examples include new administrative procedures such as overlapping jurisdictions (where two or more officials are responsible for an administrative action), service delivery surveys (for example in Tanzania and Uganda, in cooperation with the World Bank), and structural reform, where an administrative machine is decentralized or deregulation takes place. However, there are several potential problems with such strategies. For example, decentralization, a widely touted remedy for many of the African state’s contemporary ills, can also create lower-level corruption unless it is accompanied by some of the range of possible anti-corruption strategies. Nevertheless, aid donors and others hope that these reforms will improve public integrity either directly or indirectly.

Many of the less coercive anti-corruption efforts are based upon the manipulation of incentives for, and the potential punishments to be meted out to, public officials. These modern strategies are often accompanied by attempts to improve both recruitment of public officials who are more likely to be honest and better information upon their preferably honest public studies (Gould, 1980; McKinney and Johnston, 1986; Klitgaard, 1988). The anti-corruption strategy proposed is usually based upon a distinctive view of the causes and character of corruption and anti-corruption strategies: economic analyses; mass public opinion perspectives; and institutional viewpoints. Developed since the 1960s, these are outlined and evaluated in a wide variety of publications (Heidenheimer, LeVine and Johnston, 1989). Economic analyses prioritize the principal-agent market relationship to identify corruption and anti-corruption strategies, whereas mass public opinion perspectives examine the social or cultural context of corruption and suggest as a result mass attitudinal change or civic awareness anti-corruption strategies. These two approaches are well established and well regarded, with an extensive academic literature and some policy applications. A third and newer, institutional approach focuses upon the public sector and institutional reform (Doig, 1995; Stapenhurst and Langseth, 1997). This is important because it enables the analyst of corruption to suggest short-term and specific policy recommendations which focus upon, low-level corruption. This newer approach has yet to have a major impact upon policy formation. The table below summarizes the various anti-corruption strategies that are in use in the continent.

Figure 1 summarizes the various anti-corruption strategies that are in use in the continent.

Specifically, no one suggests that anti-corruption campaigns will be easy. Institutional reforms are keys to success. Uganda’s, Zambia’s, Kenya’s, Nigeria’s, South Africa’s and Namibia’s experiences illustrate some of the difficulties.

Soon after coming to power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni set up the office of Inspector general of Government to promote the rule of law and combat corruption, and he has made the anti-corruption fight one of the hallmarks of his administration. However, his more recent comments suggest ambivalence. For example, he has reportedly remarked that “corruption is not hurting development as long as the money does not leave Uganda” (Bray, 1999:16). A survey in 1998 showed that 57 percent of all households believed corruption had increased. Uganda is still publicly committed to its anti-corruption campaign, but the momentum appears to be slackening.
Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa

1. INTERNATIONAL
- New World Bank and IMF policies
- OECD efforts to criminalize transnational bribery
- Transparency International’s Inventions

2. NATIONAL
- Procedures and training within state or public sector institutions
- ‘Service Culture’ approaches
- ‘Islands of Integrity’
- Capacity-building to ‘design out’ corruption
- Legal approaches, including state funding of parties, controls on ‘revolving doors’ and patronage appointments
- Anti-Corruption agencies
- Auditor-Generals and Parliamentary oversight
- The Police and ‘Inter-Agency Co-operation’

3. LOCAL OR ‘CITIZEN’ LEVEL
- Minimizing small-scale corruption by protection against the extractive and arbitrary nature of the state.
- ‘Structural reform’ (e.g. decentralization and deregulation)
- ‘Legislative sunlight’ provisions
- New administrative procedures (e.g. overlapping jurisdictions; multiple providers; customerization of public services and service delivery surveys)
- Complaints and redress
- Community Oversight
- The Media

4. POPULIST
- Purges (e.g. of civil servants)
- ‘Making Examples’ (public humiliations and executions; quasi-official tribunals)
- ‘Moral Rearmament’ campaigns and the New Citizen


Figure 1: Types of Anti-corruption Strategy

The main lesson from these case studies is that governments on their own are unlikely to sustain integrity programs without public pressure. Here, the press and public interest groups such as Transparency International are particularly significant. But in much of Africa, Civil Society remains weak and public interest campaigns demands more than ordinary levels of courage.

Similarly, South African Judge William Health leads a powerful special investigative unit to investigate and prosecute corruption, fraud and maladministration in his country.

In Zambia, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established in 1980 by an Act of parliament, and came into effect at the end of 1982 with the task of investigating and prosecuting offenders and educating members of the public on the evil effects of corruption on society.

In 1996, the Zambian government exhibited her political will and commitment to fighting corruption by strengthening the anti-corruption law and transforming the ACC into an autonomous body. The ACC is now not subject to the control of any person or authority and is headed by a judge in the High Court of Zambia. People can channel complaints to the ACC by writing, phoning or calling a person at any of the Commission’s offices to make a report. According to Business Africa, (1998:28).

In 1982, the ACC only dealt with one case and secured a conviction. In 1990, it registered 106 prosecutions and secured 47 convictions. By 1997, the commission handled 69 cases in which 55 conviction were secured. Records up to 1997 show that the Commission has since inception registered 759 prosecutions 379 of which resulted in convictions. In 51 cases the state withdrew charges, 159 were acquitted, while 59 cases were withdrawn.
The commission has scored some successes in fighting corruption, fraud remains elusive with the majority of suspects going scot-free after cases have dragged on for years to end.

**EFFC and Control of Corruption in Nigeria**

We should not live in the illusion that corruption and corrupt practices cannot be eliminated in our country Nigeria. Also it is not part of our culture. Since it came from somewhere, let us jointly send it back to where it came from. It only requires will and commitment. We should all join hands to fight this monster to a standstill. The commission started just like any other earlier created by the government of the country. At inception, it received among other things support, accolades and criticism. American and the British governments and the European union, Prof. Wole Soyinka, Gani Fawehinmi (SAN) are those who though that the commission was the best thing to happen to the country (Patrick, 2001).

Notwithstanding, critics said the agency was another political tool in the hand of President Olusegun Obasanjo. However, in the barely three years of its existence, EFCC had added another chapter to the nation’s history. The commission exposed a lot of fraudulent Nigerians, especially those hitherto described as non-touchable. It trod where other similar agencies in the country dared not. The Economic and Financial Crimes attack corruption and corrupt practice in Nigeria. The commission is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of:

- The money laundering Act 1995;
- The Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995;
- The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994, as amended;
- The Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 as Amended and
  - Miscellaneous Offences Act; and
  - Any other law or regulations
- Part two of the Commission’s Act 2002, enumerated the functions of the commission which among others include:

  The enforcement and the due administration of the provision of this Act

  The investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud money laundering, counterfeif, illegal charge transfers, future market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scan etc.

  The coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crime law and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority.

  The adoption of measures to identify, trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities. Economic and financial crimes related offences or the properties the sale of which corresponds to such proceeds.

  The adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crime etc. going through the provision of the Commission’s Act and the spate of arrests that have been made since the establishment of the commission one, can say that the Monster “corruption” is being frontally attacked. Nuhu Ribadu (2004) observed that the commission has arrested virtually all the notorious Advance Fee Fraud Kingpins.

  “It has over 500 suspects in custody and most of them are standing trial in the various high courts in the country”. He said that the commission has recovered over N20 billion of government. It is also prosecuting one of the biggest world fraud cases involving about $242 million arising from a bank fraud in Brazil. The commission is also said to have recovered billions of naira to government in respect of failed government contracts. It has curbed illegal oil bunkering in the Nigeria-Delta Region from initial daily illegal bunkering of about 300,000 - 500,000 barrels to anything less than 30,000 barrels. The banking sector has been sanitized through the activities of the commission. Nuhu Ribadu posted that “that Know your Customer (KYC)” Principe is now substantially.

**The State of Economic and Finical Crimes in Nigeria**

Nigeria has been adjudged as corrupt. We are said to have unleashed on the world the ‘419 bug’. Some people have now tagged Nigeria a “financial terrorist” nation on account of the volume of financial crimes that emanate from Nigeria. Perhaps the picture painted of the situation by Prince Bola Ajibola, former
Attorney – General of the federation in 1988 has changed very little today. At a National Conference held from the 13th to 15th December 1988, under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of Justice, Lagos, he said:

I am mindful of the fact that corruption looms very large within the public and private sectors but our statute books are littered with laws regulating the conduct of public officers only I am also painfully aware of the fact that despite strict legislative guidelines on the Foreign Exchange transactions, there are hints of improper foreign exchange dealings within and outside the banks. It is agreed that embezzlement, over invoicing, fraudulent and over production and diversion of products, currency counterfeiting, illegal capital transfer, illegal currency manipulation and large scale banking and insurance frauds, form the centerpiece of economic crimes.

While Nigeria now has legislation to regulate the conduct of both public officers and the private sector for corrupt practices, the vices are still very much with us. Bank frauds are in the upsurge, foreign exchange abuses and manipulations are still the stock in trade of many banks, 419 still looms large, and money laundering from corrupt proceeds is visible and apparent. It was in these circumstances that he FATF threatened to impose counter measures on Nigeria in 2001 if she did nothing to update her laws and take steps to check the perpetration of economic and financial crimes. All these have contributed to keeping investors away.

It is for this reason and the international dimension, which these crimes had assumed that the promulgation of the EFCC Act 2002 became inevitable. The Act, which was re-enacted in 2004, is revolutionary in May respects. For the first time, powers of coordination and enforcement of varied but related economic and financial crimes laws are vested in one body. The definition of economic and financial crimes in A.46 of the Act is all handled by the Commission is at the heart of the economy, all critical stakeholders including security, law enforcement agencies and apex financial regulators are made members of the commission. Thirdly, apart from the offences created by the EFCC Act itself, the Commission has responsibility to specifically enforce the provisions of other principal laws bordering on economic and financial crimes including:

- The Money Laundering Act 2004;
- The Advance Fee Fraud (And Other Related Offences) Act, 2005;
- The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act, 1996;
- The Miscellaneous Offences Act, 1985;
- Any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes including the penal code and criminal code. See S.7 EFCC Act, 2004.

It is therefore not so much the lack of laws or deficiencies in them but the total neglect to enforce them that have been our bane as a nation. All good citizens of a nation must ensure the enforcement of the laws. Since the law cannot itself rule but requires men to apply it, we have to have patriotic and upright men to do so. Do we have such men? If we do, why have they failed to enforce our laws particularly economic and financial crimes?

**Anti-Corruption in Uganda**

Corruption is actually a serious crime that can undermine the social and economic development of society. Transparency International, a UK based anti-corruption watchdog defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for dishonest gain. No country is immune to corruption, but some countries are more corrupt than others. Uganda is currently viewed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world despite reported improvement in the country’s corruption ranking.

Recent studies have given strong indications that corruption in Uganda is endemic and yet the government has put in place one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption measures in Africa. Institutions established to fight corruption include the Inspectorate of Government, Directorate of Ethics & Integrity, Anti Corruption court, and Public Procurement & Disposal of Public Assets Authority. A legal framework that allows these institutions to operate effectively is also in place and this includes the Leadership Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act.
More so, civil society organizations have been established almost throughout the country, with government support, under the umbrella of Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda. So, why does the fight against corruption seem to be failing? Some people attribute it to lack of political will by the core of the Ugandan government but the government disagrees. Critics of the government often drive their point home by referring to the way top government officials implicated in misappropriation of CHOGM funds and Global Funds to fight AIDS, Malaria & Tuberculosis have been handled. For instance the DP leader, Norbert Mao, recently said: “The most corrupt top government officials are being shielded from being prosecuted by the President of this country while the poor continue to suffer paying exorbitant taxes which time to time are swindled. Meanwhile, FDC/IPC leader Col. Kizza Besigye has criticized the government for what he calls harassment of small officials in local government over corruption while leaving the ‘big fish’ to go unpunished. The only female Presidential candidate, Betty Olive Namisango Kamya, maintains that corruption has dragged the government of Uganda backwards.

However, as Uganda gears up for next year’s general elections, hope of ending corruption has been rekindled because almost all leading politicians including president Museveni have addressed the problem in their manifestos and the press now enjoys some freedom to expose corrupt officials. President Museveni has been explicit about his resolve to eliminate corruption. Last October he announced that a new army of trained professionals was ready to fight the war on corruption and that he would use a new approach that would deprive potentially corrupt officials of opportunities to misuse public funds.

Much as there is great need to support the President’s anti-corruption drive, it is also imperative that the President demonstrates more resolve to deal with corrupt officials. This however is a very delicate balancing act for obvious reasons. Combating corruption is a complex process that requires a multi-pronged and multi-agency approach. So, every stakeholder and not just politicians should get involved in the fight. Civil society organizations are doing a tremendous job in the fight against corruption amid serious financial constrain but there is still need to involve the wider community. In addition, Ugandan journalists have played enormous role in combating corruption by constantly investigating and exposing suspected or convicted corrupt officials. In Uganda, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), 1970, does not explicitly define corruption, but provides that:

Any person who shall, by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive for himself or for any other person; or corruptly give, promise or offer to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of another person, any gratification as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise on account of any member, officer or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever commits an offence.

This law confines the acts of corruption to situations only involving public officials. This obviously is restrictive as experience shows that there is private sector corruption that inadvertently impacts negatively on the public sector. It is for this and other reasons that having identified the weaknesses, there are current attempts at reviewing the law relating to dealing with corruption in Uganda.

The higher echelon in the public service strata work on a contract basis and is subject to re-evaluation. The government of Uganda is focusing on strategies of preventing corruption from occurring in the core functions of government. These core functions include:

I. Human resources management
II. Rule of law and the administration of justice
III. Economic management, including regulation
IV. Public financial management
V. Public procurement management
VI. Revenue collection
VII. Oversight and accountability
VIII. Public facilities and asset management

The prioritized basic functions depend fundamentally on the development of human resources that will provide the qualitative basis for which all the other functions are performed especially the quality of the people assigned to undertake the public offices.

There are a number of foundations for
corruption curbing policies. These include:

1) Recognition of and obedience to the rule of law and ethical code,
2) A sense of national duty, integrity and prosperity, respect for others,
3) Within government, the optimum efficiency in its core functions,
4) Recognition of the causes of the decline in or absence of all the above.

Kenya's Anti-Corruption Crusade

In the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, issued by the anti-corruption organization Transparency International, Kenya ranks 147th out of 180 countries, meaning 146 countries are supposed to be less corrupt than Kenya, and 33 countries are more corrupt. For comparison, the 180th country was Somalia whereas the 1st was Denmark. Though a useful index, this does only measure the perception of corruption in Kenya, rather than the reality of it (as corruption is concealed and hard to measure). Incidents of corruption in Kenya are not limited to large corporations or government agencies. Bribe-taking is common among many lower-level officials, with the average city-dwelling Kenyan having to pay as many as 16 bribes each month just in the course of everyday life. Kenya efforts at combating corruption date back to the colonial period. Initial efforts at addressing corruption merely focused on how best to define corrupt behavior and determining how severely to punish offenders. In this period, an anti-corruption agency was not thought necessary. Corruption was not regarded as a systemic and endemic problem, but rather as a problem that could be resolved through discrete legislative amendments.

Later efforts aimed at combating corruption embraced the idea that an anticorruption agency was a necessary component. This became clear at the apex of one party rule in the 1980’s which also coincided with revelations of grand corruption. Initial anticorruption agencies were part of the police force and lacked the independence, resources and legislative mandate to undertake their tasks. The eventual establishment of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority in the late 1990s with a legislative mandate was short-lived when the courts declared it unconstitutional in part because the then Constitution only conferred prosecutorial powers on the Attorney General. Thus, the rise of an anticorruption authority in the context of an authoritarian and corrupt government was met with judicial disapproval.

The entire government was corrupt Broader efforts at fighting corruption such as the enactment of the Public Officer’s Ethics Act in 2003 exemplify initiatives at promoting good governance in all its aspects – including the establishment of a cabinet level Secretary in charge of Governance and Ethics and the appointment of a former Transparency International (Kenya) Chair to the position; the requirement that public officers declare their wealth. Another significant example of the broader efforts designed to fight corruption was the effort to entrench the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission in the Constitution. Such entrenchment, it was argued, would insulate anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions for violating other constitutional rules such as separation of powers or the presumption of innocence.

Significant amendments to anti-corruption laws following the 2003 election of President Mwai Kibaki and appointment of credible anti-corruption crusaders to lead the campaign were met with further pushback from Parliament and leading politicians who hounded anticorruption crusaders like Mr. Githongo from office and repeatedly declined to pass constitutional amendments to insulate the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission from judicial challenges for its unconstitutionality and its investigatory powers.

Grand scale corruption even after the election of a new President in 2002 who promised an end to corruption has however almost come to naught – all three branches of government were staffed with suspected corruption offenders, the country had an Attorney General unwilling to prosecute high level corruption suspects and a judiciary keenly concerned about the abuse of the procedural rights of those who were sought to be prosecuted than the broad goals of the anti-corruption agenda. Resignations of government ministers suspected to have been involved in high level corruption were followed by a return to government after investigatory commissions white-washed the scandals.

Anti-corruption efforts continue to be hobbled in the coalition government of President
Mwai-Kibaki and Prime-Minister Raila Odinga that was formed in 2008. The August 2010 Constitution provides new hope – it entrenches an Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and enshrines the principles of transparency, public officer ethics and accountability. The new Constitution of Kenya overwhelmingly ratified in August 2010 is the latest glimpse of hope in Kenya’s anticorruption journey. A constitutionally enshrined Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission will replace the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. Looking ahead, Parliament still retains the authority to explicitly give such a Commission the authority to prosecute and one of the challenges remains whether or not Parliament will do so or if it will continue the legacy of capitalizing on lack of legal clarity about the powers of the most important anti-corruption agency in the country.

Anti-Corruption Challenges

Corruption poses at least three types of challenges for stakeholders. The first challenge is lack of political will within the government to address the problem. Corruption cannot be tackled by technical/technocratic or bureaucratic approaches alone, nor can it be treated only as another problem of market regulation or maladministration. Corruption calls for solutions of a political nature that can be influenced by donors only to a very limited extent.

Zambia’s Anti-Corruption Commission director Bradford Malumbe says:

Corruption is a very difficult crime to investigate because of the elements of satisfied customer relationship, where both parties to a transaction are satisfied with the deal and are not willing to report the offence, let alone give evidence in a court of law (Business Africa, 1998:28).

A second challenge for stakeholders is how to constrain the corrupt use of resources for power preservation purposes. The corrupt use of public and private money for power-holders to maintain their hold to power is to a large extent a question of democratic controls, by state institutions (institutions of checks and balances, control and oversight), by independent civil society organizations and the media, and by citizens through the ballot box.

Many corrupt African politicians and bureaucrats have been using favoritism and political patronage politics to protect their ill-gotten wealth. It includes a favorist and politically motivated distribution of financial and material inducements, benefits, advantages, and spoils. Techniques include money and material favors to build political loyalty and support. Power holders can pay off rivals and opposition and secure parliamentary majority. By giving preferences to private companies, they can set party and campaign funds, and by paying off government institutions of checks and control they can stop investigations and audits and gain judicial impunity. Furthermore, by buying loyal decisions from election commissioners and buying votes they can secure their re-election.

The final challenge for stakeholders is how to contribute to constraining the corrupt extraction practices of certain governments and of government institutions and officials. On the one hand, this is a question of donor country and developed world companies offering bribes – how to dry out the supply side of the problem. According to Bray (1999:16).

African commentators frequently point out that international companies share responsibilities of current high levels of corruption. In Islam, the Hadith says that “Allah curses both the givers and receivers of bribes”. and in Africa the givers often come from outside the region. The OECD has begun to tackle these problems by setting up an international convention to combat bribery in international business transactions…

Prospects

It is obvious from the preceding sections that mitigating corruption in the continent will certainly not be very easy. This is simply because, since independence Sub-Saharan African Societies have become used to thieving governments. Years of blatant and unchanged corruption and pervasive mismanagement have undermined and eroded virtually all major institutions and structures of the African society. It has also undermined the professions and economic positions of Africans.
Consequently, this state of affairs poses a formidable obstacle in the fight against corruption. As most recent United Nations Development Report suggests, no meaningful effort can be made in the area of redressing corruption if democratic participation and empowerment is weak or absent (UNDP, 1997). This implies that greater emphasis be placed on consent and consensus – building and also on strong, consistent and enduring institutions capable of maintaining transparency and accountability. At present, these pre-conditions are lacking in the continent and current efforts are feeble and myopic at best.

Related to the above is the assertion is that as far as free market economy is concerned, since it entails the control of means of production and therefore accumulation of wealth by a few, it encourages socio-economic inequality and injustice and so will continue to inhibit the growth of democracy and the fight against corruption. It will also continue to breed an oligarchy that is intrinsically corrupt and undemocratic.

Consequently, with mass-participatory democratic ethos, there can be no accountability of power effectively with economic mismanagement and maladministration and Walton corrupt which is pushing the continent into deeper into underdevelopment and poverty. In the light of the above, what are the basic initiatives that can be adopted to mitigate corruption in Africa? The next section will address this question.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. African governments should make it easier for tax evaders to pay, lower rates charged, raise penalties, review cases and enforce them.

B. African governments should computerize their civil service, encourage electronic payment systems and raise incentives to raise revenue.

C. African government should simplify procedures for prosecuting corrupt officials, establish hotlines for public reports and encourage “whistle blowing” and their protection.

D. African governments should decentralize anti corruption responsibility, encourages the passage of freedom of information legislations and encourage spot checks and surveillance.

CONCLUSION

Conclusively, corruption, as pointed all along is not just a development problem but a core issue in development policy in Africa. It is also not a discrete problem with self-contained solution but fundamentally an endogenous process that must be addressed using compressive strategies. Many Western European Societies have minimized corrupt activities in the past. Thus, the continent can do much to alleviate the cancerous effects of corruption and how it shapes and can be sustained by broader socio-economic and political realities of the continent.

REFERENCES


